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Abstract
This paper examines the information provided to the private sector by central
banks. By using the principal component analysis, we investigated the variance
of the procedural rules followed by nine major central banks about information
treatments. We investigate problems related to the information coming from the
central banks by focusing on the quantity and quality perspectives and highlight
the methodological complexity of the investigation. We find that a synthetic
quantitative index of transparency is not enough to represent the phenomenon
since it can result misleading in understanding the behavior of institutionally
different central banks associated with the same index values.
Keywords: Central bank transparency, principal components, monetary
policy.
JEL codes: E52 and E58.
CENTRAL BANKS AND INFORMATION PROVIDED
TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR*
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Enrico Marchetti
1. Introduction
The issue of central bank transparency has recently acquired a growing importance in
the macroeconomic literature on monetary policy. Reasons are of varied nature.
On the one hand, it is generally acknowledged that significant suboptimal outcomes in
the action of public authorities and institutions can be blamed to information
asymmetries between authorities or institutions and the general public. Thus, an
enquiry on the behavior regarding global information disclosure (transparency) could
be important both on the positive side (helping to detect or explain major sources of
non-market failures) and on the normative side (pointing out the direction of some
possible solution to those market failures).1
On the other hand, the problem of central bank transparency is relevant for the analysis
and evaluation of monetary policy. There exist well known arguments generally
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2favoring an explicit commitment by monetary authorities to a predefined course of
action and/or a preference for a relevant degree of independence for the same
institutions.2 The commitment to particular policies should be supported and, thus,
verifiable by the public. A particular attitude of the central bank towards information
disclosure is hence required. Central bank independence poses analogous problems. A
central bank endowed with strong independence from the control of other institutions
could be tented to pursue goals different form social welfare improvement. Such a
temptation could be higher the lower is the central bank’s transparency (and
accountability).
In order to develop the analysis of monetary authorities’ behavior towards information
disclosure, apart from theoretical studies, an empirical appraisal of central banks’
transparency is certainly needed. This theme has been effectively tackled by several
authors, (e.g. Bernake et al., 1999; Fry et al., 2000; and Blinder et al., 2001). In a
recent contribution Eijffinger and Geraats, EG henceforth, (2002) propose an index
explicitly built to summarize the information disclosure practices adopted by central
banks. This general index is a highly composite one (made up of 15 different sub-
indexes in order to include different facets of information disclosure;3 it can be
justified by reckoning that transparency or information disclosure are markedly
multifaceted and multidimensional phenomena. EG then apply their index to nine
major central banks for which it have been possible to collect the relevant
information.4 They find that the most transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, the Bank of England, and the Swedish Riksbank. An intermediate level
of transparency is associated with the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank, and
the US Federal Reserve. The least transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of
Australia, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank.
Our aim is to further elaborate the EG’s analysis by investigating more deeply the
multidimensional aspect of the problem. In other words, we consider the disclosure
practices in more general terms and to better qualify the nature of their variability
                                                          
2 The arguments for commitment stem from Barro and Gordon (1983), while those for central bank independence (as
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3 See Appendix A.
4 They first collected all the relevant information freely available in English as of in June 2001. Afterwards, for each
central bank, they sent the scores obtained for that central bank (together with a description of the index) to an officer of
the same institution, and asked for a review of the score itself. Finally, they used the responses to reassess and slightly
modify the scores. Although the time span of the data collected is not clearly assessed, it can be thought that they cover
a short-medium run period of some year.
3among national central banks. By applying principal component analysis (PCA) to the
original EG’s dataset, we tackle a twofold target. First, using a “non-centered” PCA,
section 3 refines the EG’s general index by cleaning it from some non-informative
correlation between its sub-indexes. The “cleaning” action produces a neater general
index for transparency which provides information on the absolute quantity of
information disclosed by the central banks. Second, by using a “centered” PCA, we
break down and recompose the original general EG’s index in order to single out
different perspectives, or points of view, under which the transparency behavior can be
seen. This procedure gives rise to three specific indexes5 synthesizing those
perspectives. An analysis of the central banks’ scores under those indexes allows to
cluster the sample of monetary authorities in four groups, each characterized by
composite and different characteristics under the multiple dimensions of transparency.
The next section describes and discusses EG’s dataset, also used in our study. Section
3, after explaining the difference between non-centered and centered PCA, illustrates
our results in both cases and gives our interpretation of the principal components.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Transparency and the EG’s dataset
In the construction of their index of transparency, EG (2002) follow this strategy: they
assume that transparency is mainly given by the total amount of information that a
central bank discloses to the public. Since such information can be of varied nature,
they define five major categories under which classifying the different types of
transparency. Subsequently, each category is further partitioned into three specific
values to obtain a finer classification of the various types of information flows. The
five main categories are: political transparency; economic transparency; procedural
transparency; policy transparency; and operational transparency.
1) Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. In a standard
model of monetary policy game, it could be seen as the attitude of the central bank in
communicating the form of its objective function, the values of its parameters and of
its eventual target values for the main objective variable (e.g. inflation). Political
transparency is decomposed into three sub-indexes:
- Formal objectives: It indicates the explicit communication of final targets and an
explicit prioritization in case of potentially conflicting goals. If a central bank
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4declares a single objective with explicit priority, it scores one. If it declares
multiple objectives without priority, it scores 0.5. If declares no objective, it scores
zero.
- Quantitative targets: If there is a quantification of the targets, the central bank’s
score is one, zero otherwise.
- Institutional arrangements: It signals the presence of explicit contracts or
institutional arrangements between central bank and government; it also concerns
guarantee on the instruments independence for the monetary authorities. If there
are such contracts (possibly subject to explicit override mechanisms), the score is
one, if there is no formal instrument independence, the score is 0.5, the total
absence of institutional arrangements scores zero.
2) Economic transparency is related to economic information used in setting the
monetary policy. Considering the standard game-theoretic setup, it refers to the
information that the central banks gives on the model of the economy (any theoretical
scheme synthesizing the functioning of the economic system); it also includes
economic data and the knowledge of the shocks hitting the economy (both for demand
and supply). If a monetary authority fully discloses such information, then central bank
and private sector presumably have the same knowledge of the relevant economic
facts. The sub-indexes are:
- Economic data: It includes the provision of data on money supply, inflation, GDP,
unemployment rate, and capacity utilization. If quarterly data of no more than two
out of the five variables are public, the score is zero. If quarterly data for three or
four of the variables are public, the score is 0.5. Quarterly data publicly available
for all the variable implies a value equal to one.
- Policy models: If the central bank discloses the formal macroeconomic model(s)
used for its policy analysis (to constructs forecast and to evaluate the impact of
monetary policy), the score is one, zero otherwise.
- Internal forecasts: It refers to communication of the central bank forecasts.
Forecasts are important since monetary policy actions are known to take effect
only after substantial lags. Hence, the central bank’s actions are likely to reflect
anticipated developments. If the central bank does not regularly publish its
macroeconomic forecasts on inflation and output, the score is zero. If forecasts for
inflation and output are published at a less than quarterly frequency, the score is
0.5. The provision of information on quarterly forecasts for medium-run inflation
5and output (specifying the assumptions about the monetary instrument –
conditional or unconditional forecasts) implies an entry equal to one.
3) Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It
is important as it signals how the central bank discloses its strategy rule to the public.
If, for instance, if a central banks uses a Taylor-kind rule to set monetary policy,
procedural transparency would require the communication of the general relation
between the monetary policy instrument (interest rates in the case) and the main target
or endogenous variables of the economic system. It involves:
- Explicit strategy: If the central bank provides an explicit description of its policy
rule or strategy that describes its monetary policy framework, the score is one, zero
otherwise.
- Minutes of decisional boards (or explanations in the case of a single central
banker): It constitutes comprehensive accounts of the policy deliberations. If a
central bank doesn’t release such documents within a reasonable amount of time
(eight weeks), the score is zero; by contrast, if the minutes are released without
substantial lags, the score is one.
- Voting records: It gives important information on the strategy rule can be provided
by showing how each decision on the level of policy instruments was reached. If a
central bank does not publish voting records (or if they are released after a
substantial lag – eight weeks), the score is zero; if voting records are given, the
score is one.
4) Policy transparency involves the quickness in the communication of policy
decision. Given the lags in the impact of monetary policies, a rapid communication of
policy decision can play a crucial role in informing the public on the monetary
strategies. Furthermore, monetary policy actions are typically made in discrete steps; a
central bank may be inclined to change the policy instrument, but decide to wait until
further evidence warrants moving a full step. Policy transparency is also about
explanation of decision and clear indication for future policy actions. The sub-indexes
are:
- Prompt announcement: If decisions on the main instrument or target are promptly
announced (at the latest day of implementation) the score is one; announcements
occurring with a significant lag scores zero.
- Policy explanations: If the central bank provide an explanation of its announced
decisions (always including forward-looking assessment), the score is one; if it
6provides explanations only when policy changes or in a superficial fashion, the
score is 0.5; for no explanations the score is zero.
- Policy inclination: If the central bank discloses explicit policy inclination or
indication of likely future policy actions, the score is one, otherwise zero.
5) Operational transparency refers to information on the implementation of
monetary policy. The main feature of this type of transparency concerns the way in
which policy actions are evaluated, taking into account of eventual errors and
disturbances affecting the transmission mechanism of monetary policies. It refers to
information provision on possible justifications (ex-post) of policy actions. This
category is partitioned into:
- Control errors: It refers to extent to which a central bank provides evaluations of
outcomes of its policy actions (i.e. if the operating targets have been achieved); if
such controls are performed accounting for significant deviation from targets (if
any) the score is one; if the controls are performed without providing explanations
for eventual deviations, the score is 0.5; in case of no (or very seldom) controls the
score is zero.
- Transmission disturbances: If the central bank provides regularly information on
(unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances affecting the transmission process,
the score is one; if such information are provided, but only through short term
forecasts or analysis, the score is 0.5; if no information is provided (or very
seldom), the score is zero.
- Evaluation of policy outcome: When the central bank regularly provide an
evaluation of the policies in light of its macroeconomic objectives (including an
explicit account of deviations between outcomes and objectives) it scores one;
when such evaluation is provided without explanations for deviations, the scores is
0.5; no evaluation provided (or very seldom) scores zero.
The procedure of aggregation of the 15 sub-indexes followed by EG is straightforward:
they simply sum up the indexes for each country.6 Although the partition elaborated by
EG is rather fine and comprehensive, the possibility of correlations between the
recorded scores for each variable (sub-index) and the strong multidimensionality of the
phenomenon calls for a further analysis. To this aim, the standard methods of
multivariate eigenanalysis (the most classical of which is the PCA) appear particularly
suited.
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73. The statistical model and results
3.1 The methodology
The main idea of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset that may contain
correlated variables, while retaining as much as possible of its variability. More in
detail, PCA searches for a few uncorrelated linear combinations (principal
components) of the original variables that capture most of the information in the
original variables.
Formally, given the dataset mnX ×ℜ∈  (formed by n rows namely, cases, and m
columns, namely variables), PCA is applicable to any product moment matrix of the
form Z XX ′=  or XXZ '= . Given a vector mb ℜ∈1  of unknown weights (loading),
the first principal component is obtained by maximizing the variance of 1 1Z Xb′=
under the constraint 1 1 1b b′ = . The second component is obtained in a similar manner
by introducing the additional restriction that the second component is uncorrelated
with the first one. This process is continued until as many components as variables
have been calculated.7
The principal components are usually derived from the centered original data matrix
(i.e. scores are considered as deviations from the mean of the variables). Centered
analysis is obtained in a similar way as the non-centered one, above described, by
using the similarity (covariance) matrix CS YY ′=  of the transformed data set Y, where
1
1 m
ik ik ik
k
y x x
m
=
= − ∑ . Principal components can be also derived by centering the
original data with respect to the variable (column) mean. The difference between the
two procedures is however not trivial and, being relevant for our investigation, we need
to discuss it.8
Non-centered principal components analysis implies an all-zero point (vector) of
reference: a non-transparent central bank. The multivariate analysis uses and describes
all the departures from this absolute zero.  By contrast, centering by variables transfers
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8the reference point (origin) to a hypothetical average stand. Stands now contribute
information only as far as they depart from this average composition. In other words, it
is assumed that a “uniform distributed kind” of central bank exists and deviations from
it are studied.9
The two procedures describe different situations. The decision about which is the more
appropriate depends on the kind of variability that one wants to explain. Moreover, an
advantage of non-centered analysis is that it distinguishes disjunction from mere
difference in between-axes from within-axes heterogeneity of clusters. Within-axes
heterogeneity means that the same set of axes (variables) are relevant to the
explanation of the variability of all the clusters of central banks. Between-axes
heterogeneity means that each cluster (or group of clusters) has a significant non-zero
projection only on a subset of axes, i.e. the variability associated to each cluster is
mainly explained by some axes only. In the case of within-axes heterogeneity non-
centered ordination results in a single “general” unipolar component. In the case of in
between-axes heterogeneity non-centered ordination results in several unipolar
components.10
In order to obtain an index of transparency comparable with that of EG, we first
perform a non-centered multivariate analysis since it means that our reference point is
a non-transparent central bank. The advantage of obtaining an index in this way is clear
with respect to a simple additive index. In fact, it eliminates redundant information in
the dataset and gives additional information (e.g. the second component) about the
phenomenon investigated, which can be useful to explain the nature of information
derived from the data. By contrast, performing centered PCA we implicitly accept the
EG’ index and study the variability of the data on their mean. In other words, in the
non-centered analysis the reference point is a “non-transparent” central bank. In the
centered analysis the reference point is an “average kind” of central bank.
Our investigation strategy is as follows. First, we use a non-centered PCA to derive a
quantitative index of transparency (the first unipolar principal component), which is
comparable to that of EG. In doing that, we also give an interpretation to other
components found. Second, we perform the PCA by centering the data with respect to
variable means in order to study the information provided by the central banks under a
more qualitative perspective.
                                                          
9 Of course, information regarding the absolute values is not lost, but is synthesized in the means that in such a case
have to be taken into account in the data analysis (see Noy-Meir, 1973).
10 An extensive discussion on centering (with respect different means) and non-centering is Noy-Meir (1973).
93.2 Non-centered analysis
The non-centered PCA individuates two principal components that explain about the
95% of the dataset variability. As usual in non-centered analysis, the first component is
unipolar and explains a large part of the variability (85%). The second component,
however, still explains about the 9% of data variability. Factor loadings individuate
two components. The weights11 associated with these two components are reported in
table 1.
Table 1 – Multivariate transparency indexes weights (first two components)
First component Second component
Formal Objectives 0.304 0.119
Quantitative Targets 0.288 0.372
Institutional Arrangements 0.335 0.111
Economic Data 0.288 −0.001
Policy Models 0.210 −0.184
Central Bank Forecasts 0.246 −0.058
Explicit Strategy 0.288 0.372
Minutes 0.204 −0.487
Voting Records 0.158 −0.536
Prompt Announcement 0.352 −0.007
Policy Explanation 0.277 −0.036
Policy Inclination 0.082 −0.345
Control Errors 0.321 0.000
Transmission Disturbances 0.189 0.051
Evaluation Policy Outcome 0.166 −0.114
The first component individuates a quantitative index, information sharing
index (IS index, or transparency index), which is comparable to that of EG.12
The index differs from that of EG with respect to the weights (which in EG’s
index are all the same). In our index prompt announcement, institutional
arrangements, control errors, and formal objectives are more relevant than in
the EG’s index. By contrast, policy inclination, voting records, evaluation
policy outcome, transmission disturbances result less relevant.
Regarding the second component, a possible interpretation is to relate it to the
relative quantity of information about the political transparency vs. the
                                                          
11 The software we used, MVSP, performs an R-mode PCA. The component loadings are scaled to unity, so that the
sum of squares of an eigenvector equals one, and the component scores are scaled so that the sum of squares equals the
eigenvalue.
12 Recall that non-centered PCA explain the variability of the central banks with respect to the case of central bank
associated with all zero score (i.e. a completely non transparent central bank).
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procedural transparency.13 In fact, central banks that give relatively more
quantitative information about their objective or reaction function (in terms of targets,
form, or marginal rate of substitution) have high index values. By contrast, central
banks disclosing more information about the way monetary policy decisions are taken
(i.e. providing minutes and voting records) score low.14 EG (2002) refer to explicit
strategies as an indicator procedural transparency. By contrast, in our view it is an
indicator of political transparency since it is related to the form of the policy function
of the central bank (e.g. the adoption of a Taylor-kind rule to set monetary policy). We
then refer to this index as procedural/political index (PP).
According to the loading found in table 2, central banks can be ranked as follows.
Table 2 – Transparency indexes among industrialized countries
Information sharing (IS) index Political/Procedural (PP) index
New Zealand 1.198 (1.35) Australia 0.334
UK 1.154 (1.25) Switzerland 0.297
Sweden 1.153 (1.20) Euro zone 0.248
Canada 1.049 (1.05) Canada 0.242
Euro zone 1.000 (1.00) Sweden 0.113
US 0.856 (1.00) UK −0.114
Australia 0.845 (0.80) New Zealand −0.252
Switzerland 0.801 (0.75) Japan −0.332
Japan 0.739 (0.80) US −0.554
The first index of table 2 (IS) reflects the index of EG, which is indicated in the table
between brackets (original index divided by 10 to facilitate the comparison).
The second index (PP) indicates the kind of information that central banks supply
about how monetary policy is set, as the ratio between information associated with the
debate inside the central bank in the policymaking process (procedural transparency)
and quantitative information associated with the central bank targets (political
transparency). Countries such as the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom give a relative more relevance on the information related to the
formation of the monetary policymaking process. By contrast, Australia, Switzerland,
                                                          
13 As defined by EG (2002), see our Section 2.
14 More in detail, the second component is mainly determined (with a positive weight) by explicit strategy, quantitative
targets, formal objectives, and institutional arrangements, and (with a negative weight) by the following variable voting
records, minutes, policy inclination, policy models, and evaluation policy outcome.
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Canada, the European Central Bank, and Sweden place a more relative emphasis on the
quantitative information regarding their targets.
This subsection has investigated the variability of the data set with respect to the non-
transparent central bank, and therefore, it has focused on the quantity of information.
According to our results, data are mainly associated with within-axes heterogeneity
since the weights of first component are all positive while the second component is not
unipolar. This means that the same set of variables is relevant to all the clusters of
central banks and principal components do not show the evidence of compositional
disjunction in the sample. Hence, in order to understand and describe the data variance
under a more qualitative point of view, centered PCA may result more useful than the
non centered one.15 In the next subsection, centered PCA by focusing on the quality of
information tries to introduce an additional-value to our investigation.
3.3 Centered PCA
The first three components of our centered PCA are reported in Table 3.16 Since the
first three eigenvalues explain about the 80% of the variance,17 we can restrict our
analysis to these components.
Table 3 – Centered principal component analysis (loading)
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Formal Objectives 0.130 0.293 0.033
Quantitative Targets 0.384 0.360 −0.015
Institutional Arrangements 0.119 0.053 0.131
Economic Data 0.003 −0.205 −0.034
Policy Models −0.172 0.477 −0.594
Central Bank Forecasts −0.047 0.291 0.206
Explicit Strategy 0.384 0.360 −0.015
Minutes −0.479 0.223 0.427
Voting Records −0.530 0.135 0.057
Prompt Announcement 0.000 0.000 0.000
Policy Explanation −0.030 0.024 −0.141
Policy Inclination −0.341 0.140 −0.372
Control Errors 0.011 0.240 −0.098
Transmission Disturbances 0.061 0.334 0.432
Evaluation Policy Outcome −0.107 0.199 0.212
                                                          
15 See Noy-Meir (1973) for a more technical discussion about principal component analysis and between and within
heterogeneity.
16 Also for centered PCA holds the normalization adopted for the non-centered analysis of the previous section (see
footnote 8).
17 The relative contribution of each variable is reported in detail in Table B1: Appendix B.
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The first component explains the 42% of the variance. It mainly depends on
quantitative targets, explicit strategies, formal objectives, institutional arrangements
(with positive contribution) and voting records, minutes, policy inclination (negative
contribution).18  Notice the correlation between the first component and the PP index
of Table 2. Hence, our interpretation of the first component19 is to see it as an index of
the information on the “discussion process” that determines the monetary policy vs. the
information on the final outcomes of this discussion process.20 A central bank with a
high score in the first component ceteris paribus attaches proportionally a high
importance on providing information on its formal objectives and institutional
constraints, relative to the disclosure of the internal decision process’s outcomes.
The second component groups with a positive sign policy models, forecasts,
transmission disturbances, and control errors and it is negatively affected by only the
variable economic data. Notice the correlation between this component and the IS
index. It opposes central banks that give quantitative information about their reaction
functions to central banks that do not do it. In fact the index is negatively associated
with only economic data, which has a very low variability within central banks.
The third component explains the 16% of the variance. It is mainly determined by
transmission disturbances, minutes, and evaluation of policy outcomes (positive sign)
and policy models, policy inclination, and policy explanation (negative sign). The first
group of variables (positive) seems to be associated with the ex post appraisal of the
monetary policy (operational transparency) whereas the second group (negative) can
be related to the ex ante appraisal (policy transparency).21 In general terms, it can be
said that the former represents information relevant to understand the effects of
monetary policy and the latter information useful to interpret the central bank’s
strategies.
                                                          
18 Relevant variables are determined by using a rule of thumb on their weight. However, principal component analysis
can be also interpreted as a statistical model more than a merely descriptive one and relevance statistical determined
(see Appendix D).
19 The component interpretation has to be based on the correlations between the variables and the components
themselves; these correlations can be obtained by direct calculation and are shown in Appendix B: Figure B1.
20 According to our view in contrast with EG, the variable explained strategies plays a different role. It indicates the
quick communication of the rules or strategies of the monetary policy. EG consider explained strategies as an indicator
of the procedural transparency. In our case, it is more related to the political transparency if its relevance in the
determination of the first component is considered (together with quantitative targets, explained strategies, formal
objectives, and institutional arrangements).
21 Notice that also minutes has a relevant weight in explaining the index. Minutes is also related to the policy
transparency since it refers to the publication of board minutes in reasonable times.
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Summarizing, the first component highlights the way used by the central banks to
communicate their strategies. It opposes quantitative indexes to more articulated
information, which can be used to indirectly determine the central banks’ strategies.
The second component individuates central banks which provide quantitative data on
their policy reaction function. The third component indicates the information
associated with the ex ante analysis of the monetary policy vs. its ex post analysis.
According to the above view, we refer to the three found components as the strategy
communication (SC) index, reaction parameter (RP) index, and timing-of-disclosure
(TD) index, respectively. Table 4 reports them.
Table 4 – Centered principal component analysis (scores)
SC RP TD
Australia 0.33 −0.11 0.02
Canada 0.25 0.06 −0.18
Euro zone 0.25 0.06 −0.16
Japan −0.34 −0.34 0.25
New Zealand −0.24 0.32 −0.10
Sweden 0.12 0.12 0.33
Switzerland 0.29 −0.30 −0.07
UK −0.10 0.33 0.14
US −0.56 −0.14 −0.24
Figure 1 describes the relationship between central banks and the first three
components:
Figure 1 – Central bank information (qualitative analysis)
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Legend: the horizontal axis represent SC, the vertical axis represent RP whereas the areas of pointers are correlated with
the TD.
An inspection of the above figure allows a tentative classification and interpretation of
the nature of information provided by the nine central banks. By considering the first
two components, there could be pointed out four groups of countries.
A) A first group is formed by all central banks scoring a positive RP index. These
central banks currently (or attempt to) pursue a commitment behavior by
providing information on their reaction functions. Regarding the SC index they
show not extreme absolute values. New Zealand and the United Kingdom have
an established tradition of inflation targeting (a strong form of commitment).
By contrast, Canada and Sweden are attempting to build a reputation on a
credible inflation targeting regime. This explains the relative difference in the
SC index; in fact, Canada and Sweden focus their relative information on the
quantitative variables.  European Union can be also included in this group as it
also attempts to increase its reputation in order to establish commitment
regime although without a formal inflation targeting.22
B) Other central banks are more extreme regarding the SC index. The United
States and Japan form another group. Their information disclosure appears
coherent with a general propensity for discretion in the monetary policy. In
fact, they show low levels of the indexes. As for the SC index their information
policy appears relatively more oriented to explaining the monetary strategies
without providing the quantitative variables. However, the RP index signals
                                                          
22 Inflation targeting regime is not the only form of commitment for a central bank.
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that their information policy is procedural-oriented not only in relative terms
but also in absolute ones, since the Fed and the Bank of Japan provide low
quantitative data on their policy reaction function.
C) The last group is formed by Australia and Switzerland. The information
disclosure associated with these central banks appears somehow unbalanced.
They provide relatively more information on political transparency than on
procedural transparency, but are associated with poor scores in the provision
of information regarding quantitative data of their policy. Hence they can be
associated with a low standard of general transparency.
This grouping of countries well-describe the relation between central banks and
information disclosure focusing on the different monetary policy regime (i.e.
discretionary or commitment). However, the third component (TD index) helps to
point out a further dimension of the information disclosure, transversal with respect to
our grouping. Countries as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan, which for
mandatory or cultural reasons are more inclined to be involved in a more general
(coordinate) setting of the economic policy, show higher values of the TD index, as
result of the ex post evaluation of the monetary policy. It could be thought that in a
centralized economic policy framework23 an ex post revision of the policy measures on
the basis of their effects is needed. The lack of a fiscal coordination among the
European Union members seems to confirm our intuition. The European Central Bank
scores low TD index, hence it provides more ex ante information than ex post as
expected if coordination is not present (an analogous claim can be made for the United
States).
Finally, the proposed centered PCA should be evaluated with respect to the quality of
the representation on the chosen factorial axis. The inspection of the total absolute
contribution and of the representation quality sufficiently confirms the validity of the
centered PCA (see Appendix C). With respect to the first component, it should be
noticed the particular weight of the United States that contributes to explain the
variance of the first component about for 37%. This is confirmed also by a visual
inspection of Figure 2, in which the position of the United States appears to be rather
an outlier. Anyway, the impact of the United States is not outside the usual range
accepted for this kind of analysis. For the second and third component, the impact of
the various countries is more evenly distributed.
                                                          
23 That could also involve social partners, as, e.g., centralized trade unions and business organizations.
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As for the representation quality, the first three components absorb a significant
percentage of the variance among the countries, ranging form a minimum of 69% for
Australia to a maximum of 96% for the United States. This confirms the quality of the
representation assured by the first three components. The results of the PCA highly
depends upon the structure of the data matrix (see Table A1: Appendix A), a direct
inspection of this dataset shows the relative low impact of certain variables, due to
their uniformity of distribution among countries. For instance, prompt announcement
plays no role, for its score is one for all the countries. Similarly, institutional
arrangements, quantitative targets and control errors have only a minor impact for
they are quite evenly distributed among countries.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the information provided by the central bank to the
public on both a quantitative and a qualitative side. We found that a simple index as
that elaborate by EG (refined in our non centered PCA by the IS general index)
performs well in synthesizing information about the general quantity of transparency.
However, being the information strategic, single indexes are not sufficient to fully
understand the central bank’s information issue. Multiple indexes are needed. In
particular, by running a qualitative analysis (namely centered PCA) we individuate
three indexes that better characterize the central banks and explain some difference in
the information that they produce.
We construct three indexes: strategic communication (SC) index, reaction parameter
(RP) index, and timing-of-disclosure (TD) index, highlighting different perspectives of
the multifaceted problem of transparency. The SC index is linked with way used by the
central banks to communicate their strategies. Quantitative indexes are opposed to
more articulated information, which can be used to indirectly determine the central
banks’ strategies. The RP index is a general index of quantitative (political)
transparency, which individuates central banks associated with high provision of
quantitative data about their policy reaction function. The third index, TD, indicates the
information associated with the ex ante analysis of the monetary policy vs. its ex post
analysis.
By taking account of the above three indexes, the nine central banks considered can be
clustered into three groups with respect to the monetary policy regime adopted and
further differentiated according to the general propensity of policy coordination due to
cultural or political reasons.
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The first group is made up of central banks associated with a commitment regime
(New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Euro Area, Canada and Sweden), which
provide information on quantitative transparency (high or positive RP index) and
balanced information regarding procedural and political transparency (an SC index
with small absolute values). This group can be further partitioned into three subgroups.
In the first, those central banks possessing a well established anti-inflation reputation,
as New Zealand and United Kingdom, which adopt a formal inflation targeting regime.
The second group includes monetary authorities, such as Canada and Sweden, which
are trying to build a reputation on a credible inflation targeting regime. According this
view, central banks of Canada and Sweden tend to convey more information on the
quantitative variables rather than on the procedural ones. Finally, the European Central
Bank can be considered as a special case: it also appears inclined to build a reputation
of commitment, although it is not embedded in a formal inflation targeting regime.
The second group, Japan and the United States, is formed by “discretionary” central
banks: their information disclosure and transparency behavior appear to be coherent
with a less committed and embedded arrangement. They score negative values on both
SC and RD index, so that their policy on information disclosure is more oriented in
explaining the monetary strategies without providing the formal and quantitative
objectives (low SC index), and in conveying a low level of overall information (low
RP index).
The last group, including Australia and Switzerland, can be described as characterized
by a kind of unbalance in the behavior of information disclosure. Australia and
Switzerland provide relatively less overall information, as signaled by the low level of
RP index, but also convey relatively more information on their political transparency
than on procedural transparency. Their behavior appears thus less clearly identifiable
with a general monetary regime (commitment-inflation targeting or discretion) as was
the case for the other two groups. Moreover, their information disclosure appears to be
relatively poor.
A third index (TD) allows us to develop a further and transversal classification. As the
TD index indicates the prevalence of ex post vs. ex ante information provision on
policy analysis, it can be related to the general, social and political, environment in
which monetary policy takes place. Countries, which present a general climate
favorable to a coordination in the setting of the overall economic policy, such as
Sweden, Japan and United Kingdom,24 also present a high level of the TD index; i.e. a
                                                          
24 In the case of the latter the policy coordination is due to the political arrangements more than social factors. The Bank
of England has a low level of independence in determining its target, which is influenced by the government.
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relatively higher presence of ex post information on the evaluation and analysis of
monetary policy. This could be due to the need in a coordinated framework for an ex
post revision of the policy measures. By contrast, in the United States and the Euro
Area, due to the lack of such a general coordination, central banks prefer to spread
more ex-ante information.
Our analysis is a step further in the recent transparency debate by highlighting the
quantitative perspective from an empirical point of view. Moreover, since our indexes,
derived from PCA, are by construction uncorrelated, they can be fruitful used in further
studies, as panel or cross-country econometric investigations. Regarding our further
steps toward, we aim to investigate more in general the variability of central bank
procedures regarding not only transparency but also accountability and independence
in order to better understand the central bank institutional design.
Appendix A – Dataset and data matrices
Table A1 – Dataset (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002)
Aus Can Eur Jap NZ Swe Swi UK US
Formal Objectives 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5
Quantitative Targets 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Institutional Arrang. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5
Economic Data 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1
Policy Models 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Central Bank Forecasts 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5
Explicit Strategy 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Minutes 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Voting Records 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Prompt Announcement 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Policy Explanation 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1
Policy Inclination 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Control Errors 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1
Transmission Disturb. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 0
Evaluation Policy Out. 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0.5
Legend. Aus: Australia; Can: Canada; Eur: Euro Zone; Jap: Japan; NZ: New Zealand; Swe: Sweden; UK:
United Kingdom; US: United States.
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Table A2 – Centered data form Table A1
Aus Can Eur Jap NZ Swe Swi UK US
Formal Objectives 0,166 0,166 0,166 -0,33 0,166 0,166 -0,33 0,166 -0,33
Quantitative Targets 0,222 0,222 0,222 -0,77 0,222 0,222 0,222 0,222 -0,77
Institutional Arrang. 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 -0,44
Economic Data -0,33 0,166 0,166 0,166 -0,33 0,166 0,166 -0,33 0,166
Policy Models -0,55 0,444 0,444 -0,55 0,444 -0,55 -0,55 0,444 0,444
Central Bank Forecasts -0,16 -0,16 -0,16 -0,16 0,333 0,333 -0,16 0,333 -0,16
Explicit Strategy 0,222 0,222 0,222 -0,77 0,222 0,222 0,222 0,222 -0,77
Minutes -0,55 -0,55 -0,55 0,444 0,444 0,444 -0,55 0,444 0,444
Voting Records -0,44 -0,44 -0,44 0,555 0,555 -0,44 -0,44 0,555 0,555
Prompt Announcement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Policy Explanation -0,27 0,222 -0,27 -0,27 0,222 0,222 0,222 -0,27 0,222
Policy Inclination -0,22 -0,22 -0,22 -0,22 0,777 -0,22 -0,22 -0,22 0,777
Control Errors 0,111 0,111 0,111 -0,38 0,111 0,111 -0,38 0,111 0,111
Transmission
Disturbances
0 0 0 0 0 0,5 -0,5 0,5 -0,5
Evaluation Policy  Out. -0,44 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,555 -0,44 0,055 0,055
Table A3 – Similarity matrix (non-centered PCA)
FO QT IA ED PM CBF ES M VR PA PE PI CE TD EPO
FO 0.844
QT 0.813 0.875
IA 0.906 0.875 1.031
ED 0.750 0.688 0.875 0.844
PM 0.563 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.625
CBF 0.656 0.625 0.719 0.594 0.438 0.563
ES 0.813 0.875 0.875 0.688 0.500 0.625 0.875
M 0.500 0.375 0.563 0.500 0.375 0.500 0.375 0.625
VR 0.375 0.250 0.438 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.250 0.500 0.500
PA 0.938 0.875 1.063 0.938 0.625 0.750 0.875 0.625 0.500 1.125
PE 0.719 0.688 0.813 0.750 0.500 0.594 0.688 0.500 0.375 0.875 0.750
PI 0.188 0.125 0.188 0.188 0.250 0.188 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
CE 0.875 0.813 0.938 0.813 0.625 0.688 0.813 0.563 0.438 1.000 0.781 0.250 0.938
TD 0.531 0.500 0.563 0.438 0.313 0.438 0.500 0.375 0.250 0.563 0.406 0.063 0.531 0.406
EPO 0.438 0.375 0.469 0.438 0.313 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.250 0.500 0.406 0.125 0.469 0.313 0.313
Legend. FO: formal objectives, QT: quantitative targets; IA: institutional arrangements; ED: economic data;
PM: policy models; CBF: central bank forecasts; ES: explicit strategy; M: minutes; VR: voting records; PA:
prompt announcement;
PE: policy explanation; PI: policy inclination; CE: control errors; TD: transmission disturbances; and EPO:
evaluation policy outcomes.
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Table A4 – Covariance matrix (centered PCA)
FO QT IA ED PM CBF ES M VR PA PE PI CE TD EPO
FO 0.06
QT 0.08 0.19
IA 0.02 0.05 0.03
ED -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.06
PM 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.28
CBF 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.06
ES 0.08 0.19 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.19
M -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.11 0.28
VR -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.04 -0.14 0.22 0.28
PA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PE -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07
PI -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.19
CE 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
TD 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.13
EPO 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.09
Appendix B – Centered PCA
The principal components in the centered PCA (the first three of which are shown in
Table 3) are obtained as eigenvectors b of the equation: bXbX λ=' , where X ′  is the
centered data matrix of Table A2; the resulting eigenvalues λ  are shown in Tab. B1
(the last seven eigenevalues are all zero).
Table B1 - Eigenvalues of matrix X’X and explained variance (percentage and cumulative percentage)
Component
1
Component
2
Component
3
Component
4
Component
5
Component
6
Component
7
Component
8
Eigenvalues 0,827 0,466 0,317 0,145 0,14 0,05 0,012 0,009
Percentage 42,072 23,711 16,108 7,391 7,117 2,551 0,615 0,436
Cum.
Percent.
42,072 65,783 81,891 89,282 96,399 98,949 99,564 100
The above mentioned problem has a dual in the space of the units, i.e. ccXX µ=' , so
that λ  and µ  are identical. An indication of the correlation between variables
(columns of X) can be obtained by the definition of the components c in the space of
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the units (cfr. Lebart 1995); the j-th element of c relative to α -th eigenvalue αµ , i.e.
)( jcα , is given by:
1
( )1
( )  ( , )
n
ij
j j
i
x b i
c j x b s corr j bαα α α
α αλ λ=
′= = =∑
where js  is the standard deviation of variable j computed form Table A1. Figure B1
plots the values of )( jcα  for the two first eigenvalues (1st and 2nd Components in
Table B1):
Figure B1 – Non-centered principal component analysis (Euclidean biplot)
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Variables which span a small angle with the first component (axis) 1b  are those more
correlated with the same factorial axis, and determine the interpretation of the latter.
Appendix C – Total contributions and representation quality for centered PCA
The main instrument to control the quality of a PCA are the Total absolute contribution
index (TAC) and the Representation quality (RQ). The first index is given by the
formula:
α
α
α
α
α λ
2
1
2
2 )(
)(
)(
)(
ic
ic
ic
iTAC
n
i
==
∑
=
where )(icα  is the score of country i under the α -th component. It explains how much
of the variance explained by the α  component is due to the i-th unit, so signaling
potentials outliers. Table C1 shows the TAC values for the first eight non zero
components.
Table C1 – TAC values for the centered PCA
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 Axis 7 Axis 8
Australia 0,1324 0,02691 0,0018 0,08193 0,13211 0,48672 0,01008 0,0160
Canada 0,0731 0,00772 0,1022 0,00662 0,15857 0,02738 0,00208 0,4840
EU 0,0767 0,00673 0,0757 0,03879 0,20160 0,00288 0,14700 0,3240
Japan 0,1406 0,24226 0,1940 0,08962 0,02160 0,01800 0,14700 0,0360
N. Zealand 0,0696 0,22527 0,0302 0,02400 0,26606 0,00242 0,26133 0,0090
Sweden 0,0177 0,02887 0,3477 0,42075 0,03500 0,02178 0,00533 0,0111
Switzerland 0,1016 0,18929 0,0163 0,03283 0,17160 0,30258 0,03333 0,0401
UK 0,0128 0,23227 0,0574 0,25689  2,86E-05 0,07200 0,25208 0,0090
US 0,3751 0,04146 0,1742 0,04982 0,01446 0,06962 0,14700 0,0187
The representation quality index is given by:
∑
=
=
p
ic
ic
iRQ
1
2
2
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α
α
α
α
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where p is the number of the significant eigenvalues λ  considered in the analysis. It
gives a measure for contribution of the α -th factor in the representation (or
explanation) of the i-th element. The RQ values for the centered PCA are given in
Table C2:
Table C2 – RQ values for the centered PCA
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 Axis 7 Axis 8
Australia 0,61669 0,07060 0,00324 0,06687 0,10411 0,13698 0,00068 0,00081
Canada 0,48247 0,02870 0,25831 0,00766 0,17700 0,01091 0,00019 0,03472
EU 0,49099 0,02424 0,18575 0,04349 0,21821 0,00111 0,01363 0,02254
Japan 0,37547 0,36454 0,19859 0,04196 0,00976 0,00290 0,00569 0,00104
New Zealand 0,26636 0,48544 0,04441 0,01609 0,17225 0,00056 0,01450 0,00037
Sweden 0,07125 0,06548 0,53641 0,29690 0,02384 0,00530 0,00031 0,00048
Switzerland 0,37854 0,39703 0,02333 0,02143 0,10813 0,06809 0,00180 0,00162
UK 0,05860 0,59790 0,10067 0,20575 2,21E-05 0,01988 0,01671 0,00044
US 0,77667 0,04836 0,13824 0,01808 0,00506 0,00871 0,00441 0,00042
Appendix D – Centered principal component analysis: The statistical model25
Principal component analysis is a descriptive tool. However, it can also be interpreted
as a statistical model, and therefore, its asymptotic standard errors for covariance
matrix and the percentage of explained variance can be computed.26 The principal
component model can be written in matrix terms as:
(d.1) X AB ε′= +
where mnX ×ℜ∈  is the matrix of observations, fnA ×ℜ∈  is a matrix of factor scores,
fmB ×ℜ∈  is a matrix of factor loadings, and mn×ℜ∈ε  is a matrix of (normal
distributed) residuals. In the principal component analysis model, A are unknown
parameters (fixed effects) to be estimated, and so X is restricted to belong to be of rank
k computes asymptotic standard errors of the principal components model for
covariance and correlation matrices and the percentage of explained variance.
Identification and parameterization of rank models is non-trivial. Let ffL ×ℜ∈  be a
regular (invertible) matrix, then
                                                          
25 Principal components are computed by using STATA with a freeware ado-file written by Jeroen Weesie (Department
of Sociology, Utrecht University) and MVSP of Kovach Computers.
26 See Anderson (1963) and Tyler (1981).
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(d.2) ( )( )1AB AL L B−′ ′=
Thus, there is considerable freedom to transform (“rotate”) A and B into a standardized
format. We use an identifying restriction that B is row-wise orthogonal, i.e., the
columns of B have norm 1, and are uncorrelated with each other.
Principal component analysis are computed as maximum-likelihood estimators based
on the assumption that the εij are independently and identically normal distributed with
a common variance σ (see Andersen, 1963). Estimates may be sensitive to violations
of the normality assumption, and therefore, asymptotic results should be interpreted
cautiously. Results of principal component analysis are reported in the following
tables. Prompt Announcement has been removed since its variability in the sample is
zero.
Table D1 – Principal components of covariance matrix
Components 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Eigenvalues 0.827 0.466 0.317 0.145 0.140 0.050 0.012 0.009
var explained (%) 0.421 0.237 0.161 0.074 0.071 0.026 0.006 0.004
cum  var explained (%) 0.421 0.658 0.819 0.893 0.964 0.990 0.996 1.000
Standard errors 0.130 0.098 0.060 0.041 0.015 0.004 0.002 0.000
Number of observations 14, number of factors 4 ( ρ = 0.893%, std. err. 0,041). Notice that components
from 9 to 14 are ruled out since the first 8 components explain about the 100% of the variance. Standard
errors are based on multivariate normality.
Table D2 (a) – First component (detail)
coefficient std err Z P>|z| 95% confidence interval
Formal Objectives -0.130 0.172 -0.755 0.451 -0.467 0.207
Quantitative Targets -0.384 0.212 -1.810 0.070 -0.799 0.032
Institutional Arrang. -0.119 0.065 -1.821 0.069 -0.247 0.009
Economic Data -0.003 0.148 -0.017 0.986 -0.294 0.288
Policy Models  0.172 0.348  0.494 0.621 -0.510 0.854
C.B.Forecasts  0.047 0.185  0.256 0.798 -0.315 0.409
Explicit Strategy -0.384 0.212 -1.810 0.070 -0.799 0.032
Minutes  0.479 0.195  2.451 0.014  0.096 0.861
Voting Records  0.530 0.115  4.628 0.000  0.306 0.755
Prompt Announc.  0.030 0.119  0.248 0.804 -0.204 0.263
Policy Explanation  0.341 0.174  1.953 0.051 -0.001 0.682
Policy Inclination -0.011 0.152 -0.071 0.943 -0.308 0.286
Control Errors -0.061 0.244 -0.249 0.803 -0.540 0.418
Transmission Dist.  0.107 0.166  0.645 0.519 -0.218 0.431
Eval. Policy Out. -0.130 0.172 -0.755 0.451 -0.467 0.207
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Table D2 (b) –Second component (detail)
coefficient std err z P>|z| 95% confidence interval
Formal Objectives  0.293 0.094  3.103 0.002  0.108 0.478
Quantitative Targets  0.360 0.232  1.551 0.121 -0.095 0.816
Institutional Arrang.  0.053 0.142  0.371 0.710 -0.226 0.332
Economic Data -0.205 0.144 -1.425 0.154 -0.487 0.077
Policy Models  0.477 0.534  0.893 0.372 -0.570 1.525
C.B. Forecasts  0.291 0.188  1.549 0.121 -0.077 0.660
Explicit Strategy  0.360 0.232  1.551 0.121 -0.095 0.816
Minutes  0.223 0.461  0.483 0.629 -0.681 1.126
Voting Records  0.135 0.334  0.403 0.687 -0.520 0.790
Prompt Announc.  0.024 0.210  0.113 0.910 -0.388 0.436
Policy Explanation  0.140 0.400  0.349 0.727 -0.645 0.925
Policy Inclination  0.240 0.115  2.092 0.036  0.015 0.465
Control Errors  0.334 0.378  0.884 0.377 -0.407 1.076
Transmission Dist.  0.199 0.245  0.812 0.417 -0.281 0.680
Eval. Policy Out.  0.293 0.094  3.103 0.002  0.108 0.478
Table D2 (b) – Third component (detail)
Coefficient std err z P>|z| 95% confidence interval
 0.033 0.263  0.124 0.901 -0.484 0.549
Formal Objectives -0.015 0.352 -0.042 0.967 -0.704 0.675
Quantitative Targets  0.131 0.095  1.381 0.167 -0.055 0.318
Institutional Arrang. -0.034 0.276 -0.124 0.901 -0.575 0.507
Economic Data -0.594 0.457 -1.300 0.194 -1.490 0.302
Policy Models  0.206 0.265  0.777 0.437 -0.314 0.726
C.B. Forecasts -0.015 0.352 -0.042 0.967 -0.704 0.675
Explicit Strategy  0.427 0.265  1.611 0.107 -0.093 0.946
Minutes  0.057 0.289  0.196 0.845 -0.510 0.623
Voting Records -0.141 0.261 -0.540 0.589 -0.653 0.371
Prompt Announc. -0.372 0.273 -1.361 0.174 -0.907 0.164
Policy Explanation -0.098 0.230 -0.427 0.669 -0.550 0.353
Policy Inclination  0.432 0.306  1.411 0.158 -0.168 1.032
Control Errors  0.212 0.291  0.727 0.467 -0.359 0.783
Transmission Dist.  0.033 0.263  0.124 0.901 -0.484 0.549
Eval. Policy Out.  0.033 0.263  0.124 0.901 -0.484 0.549
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Table D2 (c) –Fourth component (detail)
Coefficient std err z P>|z| 95% confidence interval
-0.049 0.633 -0.077 0.938 -1.290 1.192
Formal Objectives  0.071 2.223  0.032 0.975 -4.287 4.428
Quantitative Targets -0.104 0.512 -0.203 0.839 -1.108 0.900
Institutional Arrang.  0.296 3.674  0.081 0.936 -6.905 7.498
Economic Data -0.225 3.712 -0.061 0.952 -7.499 7.050
Policy Models  0.137 1.397  0.098 0.922 -2.600 2.875
C.B. Forecasts  0.071 2.223  0.032 0.975 -4.287 4.428
Explicit Strategy  0.204 0.600  0.340 0.734 -0.972 1.380
Minutes -0.397 2.118 -0.188 0.851 -4.548 3.753
Voting Records  0.598 0.953  0.627 0.530 -1.270 2.466
Prompt Announc.  0.351 3.296  0.106 0.915 -6.109 6.811
Policy Explanation  0.055 1.134  0.049 0.961 -2.167 2.277
Policy Inclination -0.122 1.993 -0.061 0.951 -4.028 3.783
Control Errors  0.349 4.011  0.087 0.931 -7.512 8.211
Transmission Dist. -0.049 0.633 -0.077 0.938 -1.290 1.192
Eval. Policy Out. -0.049 0.633 -0.077 0.938 -1.290 1.192
References
Anderson, T.W. (1963), “Asymptotic theory for principal components analysis”, Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 34: 468-488.
Barro, R.J. and D. Gordon (1983), “Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary
policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101-121.
Berger, H., J. de Haan, and S. Eijffinger (2001), “Central bank independence: an update of
theory and evidence”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15: 3-40.
Bernake, B., T. Laubach, F. Mishkin and A. Posen (1999) Inflation targeting: lessons from the
international experience Priceton, Princeton University Press.
Blinder, A., C. Goodhart, P. Hildenbrand, D. Lipton and C. Wyplosz (2001) “How do central
banks talk?”, Geneva Report on the World Economy,  ICMB.
Canzoneri, M.B. (1985), “Monetary policy games and the role of private information”,
American Economic Review, 75: 1056-1070.
Cukierman, A. (2002) “Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and
what difference does it make?”, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 84: 15-35.
27
Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (1999), “Central bank independence, centralisation of wage
bargaining, inflation and unemployment: Theory and some evidence”, European Economic
Review, 43: 1395-1434.
Demertziz, M. and A. Hughes-Hallet (2003), “Central bank transparency in theory and
practice”, paper presented at the EcoMod conference 2003 at Istanbul.
Dunteman, G.H. (1989), “Principal component analysis”, Sage University Paper series on
Quantitative Applications in Social Science, 07-069, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. and P.M. Geraats (2002), “How transparent are central banks?”, CEPR
Discussion Paper, No 3188.
Faust, J. and L. Svensson (2001), “Transparency and credibility: Monetary policy with
unobserved goals”, International Economic Review, 42: 369-397.
Faust, J. and L. Svensson (2002), “The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in
monetary policy”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 34: 520-539.
Fry, M., J. DeAnne, L. Mahadeva, S. Roger and G. Stern (2000) “Key issues in the choice of
monetary policy framework” in Mahadeva L., G. Stern (eds) Monetary policy frameworks in
global context, London, Routledge
Geraats, P.M. (2003), “Central bank transparency”, Economic Journal, 112: 532-565.
Grüner, H.P. (2002), “How much should central bank talk? A new argument”, Economics
Letters, 77: 195-198.
Guzzo, V. and A. Velasco (1999), “The case for a populist central banker”, European Economic
Review, 43: 1317-1344.
Gylfason, T. and A. Lindbeck (1994), “The interaction of monetary policy and wages”, Public
Choice, 79: 33-46.
Lawler, P. (2001), “Monetary policy, central bank objectives and social welfare with strategic
wage setting”, Oxford Economic Papers, 53: 94-113.
Lebart, L., A. Morineau, and M. Piron (1995), Statistique exploratoire multidimesionelle, Paris,
Dunod.
Noy-Meir, I. (1973), “Data Transformation in ecological ordination: I. some advantage of non-
centering”, Journal of Ecology, 61: 329-341.
Okamoto, M. (1997), “Four techniques of principal component analysis”, Journal of the
Japanese Statistical Society, 2: 63-69.
28
Rogoff, K. (1985), “The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100: 1169-1189.
Tyler, D.E. (1981), “Asymptotic inference for eigenvectors”, Annals of Statistics, 9: 725-736.
Walsh, C. (2003), “Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting”, Univeristy of
California Santa Cruz, mimeo. Forthcoming in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
